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ABSTRACT 
In  the past 15  years,  industrial-organization economists have significantly expanded the 
range of algorithms for calculating welfare losses due to  imperfect competition.  We compare 
eleven empirical estimates of economic losses due to  market power in  47 U.S. food 
manufacturing industries, almost all of them  previously unpublished.  Each of the studies 
incorporate different theoretical assumptions about demand conditions,  supply conditions, or 
industry pricing behavior; or they utilize various data sources,  time periods, and  assumptions 
about the proper competitive benchmark.  The estimates of average allocative losses due 
imperfect competition range from  0.2 percent to  an  impossibly high 289 percent of industry 
output; consumer losses range from  6.0 percent to  816 percent.  However, there is a high 
degree of congruence in  the rankings of economic losses due to  market power.  Hence, from 
the perspective of antitrust enforcement, the choice of industry targets has not been greatly 
altered by advances in  estimation techniques. Introduction 
In  the beginning was Harberger (1954). 
His seminal investigation into the size of welfare losses due to  monopoly power has 
spawned scores of studies,  each claiming to  incorporate some sort of improvement,  that 
confirm, contradict, or at the least update Harberger's estimate.  Harberger's paper is so well 
known that the geometric representation of the net social welfare loss due to  monopoly 
(~ABC  in  Figure 1)  is now known to economists as  the "Harberger Triangle. III 
The studies that followed  Harberger's paper focussed on their criticism initially on the 
number of measurement or data-source issues.  Many studies published up  through the 1960s 
confirmed allocative losses almost as  low as  Harberger's (0.06 percent of GNP), but most of 
the subsequent responses found  considerably higher estimates (some as high as seven 
percent).  Other follow-up  studies took the position that even if the Harberger loss was 
insignificant, a broader concept of losses was the appropriate focus of investigation.  In 
particular, some of the profit rectangle (LJP  ,j3AP  c), conventionally regarded a pure income 
transfer (changes in  equity), was argued to be an  additional source of social loss.  In  addition 
to various empirical issues,  beginning around  1980 the field  of industrial organization 
experienced great progress in  oligopoly theory,  in  the sense that older models were often 
shown to be special cases of the newer models.  These theoretical advances resulted in  the 
The triangle also represents "allocative losses"  or the "deadweight loss"  to 
society.  If marginal costs are rising,  the total deadweight loss includes a 
triangle just below MBC representing producer losses.  Figure 1 is  based on 
the traditional,  Marshallian concept of consumer welfare and demand. 
Hicksian concepts of demand (the compensating and equivalent variations) may 
be theoretically preferred, but Willig (1976) has shown that Marshallian 

















Figure 1.  Welfare Losses and Income Transfers Due to Monopolistic Pricing . 3 
development of several formulas that permit new empirical estimates of the losses due to 
market power.  These newer approaches may  be evolutionary refinements of previous 
estimates, or they  may  be radical breaks from  the past.  Many economists are concerned that 
the former empirical advances made in  industrial organization may  be rendered obsolete, 
, 
discrediting the Bainsian mainstream of industrial organization. 
Having accurate estimates of economic losses due to  imperfect competition is important 
for public policy decision making.  The allocation of antitrust enforcement effort is closely 
related to such  losses,  with efficiency criteria uppermost during some political regimes and 
equity concerns given greater weight under other political philosophies (Preston and Connor 
1992). 
This paper examines the impact of the theoretical developments of the  1980s on 
empirical estimation of economic losses due to  market power.  The main question addressed 
is whether the new theoretical approaches produce estimates of welfare losses that diverge 
from  those of the Bainsian tradition, or whether the previous findings  may be seen as  special 
cases of the new estimates.  Specifically, we are interested in  whether eleven cross-sectional 
estimates of welfare loss and  ten estimates of consumer overcharges due to  market power in 
the U.S. food  manufacturing industries are sensitive to  the following factors: 
•  alternative conceptual models and  their underlying assumptions, 
•  measurement issues,  especially assumptions concerning parametric values, 
•  types of data employed for testing,  and 
•  time periods. 
Of the 21  sets of loss estimates presented in  this paper, only three or four were previously 
published. 
The alternative oligopoly models considered in  this paper fall  into four classes of 
pricing behavior:  monopoly pricing, Cournot pricing, price leadership, and industry-wide 4 
oligopoly pricing whose nature is  not predetermined by the researcher.  Some empirical 
estimates are derived from predicted Lerner indexes that employ rich specifications of market 
structure and firm conduct, while others are calculated from  formulas containing only two or 
three variables (numbers of companies,  market concentration, and industry demand 
elasticity).  Some estimates assume fixed values for demand or supply elasticities that the 
researcher defends as reasonable,  while other approaches allow these parameters to vary 
across market observations.  Another difference in  empirical approaches is the competitive 
standard employed.  While most choose perfect competition, some choose the less precise but 
possibly more pragmatic "workable" competition.  All  the estimates developed herein begin 
with national industry sales concentration data published by  the U. S.  Bureau of the Census, 
but some studies adjust these data for the size of geographic markets or the existence of 
strategic groups of firms within industries.  As  for data sources,  some studies rely on Census 
price-cost margins, whereas others utilize commercial price data.  2  Moreover, earlier studies 
tended to draw upon broadly defined, aggregated industry data,  whereas more recent studies 
have employed micro-data sets.3  Finally, the time periods analyzed include years between 
1967 and  1987. 
2 
3 
We did not include structure-conduct studies based on company profit data in 
our survey of food-manufacturing studies, though there are a few  good ones 
available (see Connor, et al.  1985:Chapter 7). 
Harberger's original study examined 73  industries as representative of the 
whole manufacturing sector.  In  the food  manufacturing studies cited below, 
some use 43  to  50 four-digit industry observations, while others use more than 
100 five-digit food product classes.  Two studies were based on samples of 
hundreds of food  products taken  from  commercial grocery information services 
that contained more than 50,000 food  brands in the universe. 5 
Harberger Exposed 
The history of estimation attempts may  be seen as a progressive loosening of the rigid 
assumptions embodied in  Harberger's study.  In  order to calculate the area of LlABC,  he 
made the following  five key assumptions:  th" e demand curve (DD')  is linear;  marginal costs 
(MC) are linear and constant; firms in  the industry practice perfect (cartel) monopoly 
pricing;  the competitive profit rate equals the observed average profit rate in  the 
manufacturing sector (that is,  the competitive price Pc =Po the observed market price, on 
average); and the absolute value of elasticity of own-price, retail demand  (1])  is  unity for all 
industries.
4  Most of the initial criticism of Harberger focussed on  measurement issues and 
examined the sensitivity of Harberger's estimate to changes in  data bases,  methods of 
calculation, or competitive benchmarks.  However, nearly all  subsequent research on welfare 
losses due to  market power has retained one or more of these five assumptions, so they 
deserve to be examined in  some detail: 
1.  Linear demand.  This assumption leads to  smaller welfare loss estimates compared 
to nonlinear demand schedules that are convex to  the origin (see Figure 2). 
Moreover,  the demand curve utilized implicitly in  most research is  the Marshallian 
(uncompensated) concept,  instead of the theoretically preferred Hicksian welfare 
measures of change in  consumer surplus.  Only when the income effect of a price 
change is  zero do the three measures coincide (Just,  et al.  1982:93-94). 
4  The formula for the change in  net social  welfare (DWL) is then 
1  p  -P 











Welfare Losses and Income Transfers, Linear Demand (DD) Compared to 
Convex Demand (D'O'). 
Note:  Shaded areas show increases in losses when demand schedule is convex compared to 
linear. 7 
2.  Constant marginal cost (MC) curve.  One of the most frequent assumptions,  widely 
regarded as  "simplifying."  But in  fact the deadweight loss will vary systematically 
as  E, the MC elasticity, takes positive (diseconomies of scale) or negative 
(economies of scale) values.  Harberger assumed  E=OO,  which means that the 
deadweight loss affects only consumer surplus.  Furthermore, by assuming that all 
firms in  an  industry have equal marginal costs,  products are technologically 
standardized.  The demand and supply assumptions,  taken  together, assume a 
market in  long-run equilibrium. 
3.  Effective cartel pricing.  This assumption requires a high degree of pricing 
cooperation based on  high  seller concentration, blockaded entry, and full,  certain 
knowledge by  cartel members about demand and supply conditions.  Oligopolies 
that adopt noncooperative pricing, limit, pricing, or price leadership will, ceteris 
paribus,  produce different welfare losses than cartels. 
4.  The competitive standard.  Harberger was widely criticized for adopting average 
manufacturing sector profits as the competitive standard (Scherer 1970,  1980).  If 
sellers earn non-zero economic profits from  market power, then by using average 
profits as  the basis of comparison, the analyst is  implicitly choosing a price like Po 
instead of Pc' which will bias the estimated deadweight loss downward (Figure 1). 
Moreover, because economic profits become capitalized into asset values as 
"goodwill" by accounting methods, capital costs as stated in  financial reports will be 
higher than  their true marginal social costs,  thus driving downward calculated 
returns on  investment.  On  the other hand,  reported accounting profits may  be too 
high because of transitory disturbances,  high  industry risks, or superiority rents. 8 
Finally, using manufacturing profits as  a standard biases estimates of economy-wide 
dead-weight losses downward because profit rates tend to be lower in  most other 
sectors, which have lower capital output ratios.  In  short, accounting profits may be 
biased surrogates for Pc  or Me.  Direct measures of prices or marginal costs 
should be used when available. 
5.  Unit demand elasticity  (1]=1).  This was Harberger's assumption that was the most 
criticized, partly because it is  too low to be consistent with the simple monopoly 
model.  Unless marginal costs are zero, point B in  Figure 1 must be in  the elastic 
range of DD / (that is,  1]> 1).  Moreover, most critics found  Harberger's 
assumption about the constancy of 1]  across all  industries difficult to accept. 
Because 1]  is  inversely related to the slope of BC, ceteris paribus, as  1]  increases, 
so does the area of flARe.  However, for a given demand curve,  the first-order 
condition for profit-maximization by a monopoly requires that 
P  -p 
m  c 
Pm 
1  h  .  = -;  t  at IS, 
1] 
the monopoly price wedge and  1]  are inversely related. 
Scherer (1970) suggested that  1]  should be well above unity because of the long-
term substitution of outputs among manufacturing industries (e.g., aluminum for 
steel, petroleum for coal).  However, very long-run substitution in  the food 
.. 
processing industries occurred mainly by replacement of existing traditional on-farm 
or residential processing activities (Connor 1982).  Industry demand elasticities may 
be low if cartel members face uncertainty (see Wahlroos  1984) or if entry is not 
blockaded (Masson and Shaanan  1984).  In  short, demand elasticities in  food 9 
manufacturing are likely to be much  lower than  the levels suggested by Scherer or 
Harberger. 
Finally, a point not noted in  this literature is  that sellers below the retail level 
used their industry's derived demand curve for decision-making.  As is well known, 
only under very special margin relationships (specifically, constant percentage 
mark-ups) can derived  11  be the same as the retail  11  at any given output. 
Otherwise, the derived  11  is  less than  the retail  11.  Reliable estimates of retail food 
own-price elasticities typically fall  in  the 0.3 to  0.7 range (Huang  1985),  so food 
man.ufacturin.g elasticities are likely to  be in  a lower range. 
Expanded Welfare Loss Concepts 
In  addition to relaxing Harberger's assumptions,  more recent estimates have employed 
expanded definitions of social loss.  Alternative concepts of social loss due to market power 
follow from  a reexamination of the profit rectangle PmBAPc in  Figure 1, which is 
conventionally regarded as  a pure income transfer.  However,  marginal costs can rise from 
Pc  to X on  Figure 1 for firms that exercise market power.  In this case,  the lower portion of 
the monopoly profits rectangle should be regarded as a social loss with  the entire rectangle 
an  upper bound on  social  losses. 
Supracompetitive costs can arise from  two sources.  First is lax cost controls in the 
absence of competitive pressures, what Leibenstein (1966) called X-inefficiency.  There are 
many possible sources of X-inefficiency in  oligopolies (Franz 1988).  A second, perhaps 
larger source is  rent-seeking by  firms.  Posner (1975) was perhaps the first to  argue that the 
costs of lobbying for regulations or costs incurred to  raise barriers to entry should be 10 
regarded as socially wasteful.  Cowling and Mueller regarded the portion of advertising 
expenditures by  incumbent firms intended to  raise entry barriers as a major source of 
elevated costs. 
A second alternative to  the Harberger concept of social loss empirical approach takes 
the position that finding accurate estimates of industry supracompetitive costs due to  market 
power (point X,  Figure 1)  is  too difficult.  Instead,  the focus is on estimating the trapezoid 
P  mBCAP c' which is composed of a dead-weight loss and an  income transfer from consumers 
to producers.  The entire trapezoid is  the consumer loss due to  market power.  5 
Justification for this second approach arises from  a concern about increasing the 
inequality of in<;:ome  distribution.  Oligopoly pricing is  formally the same as an  excise tax on 
consumers.  Like tax-incidence analysis, one can calculate the implicit income-redistribution 
effects of oligopoly pricing.  A study by Powell (1987) found  that by reducing actual levels 
of four-firm concentration to  40 percent, income in  the top one-sixth U.S. income stratum 
was reduced by  1.45 percent, but income increased in  the other five strata by 0.3 to 0.7 
percent.  Connor, et.  al.  (1985) calculated benefits of similar magnitude from 
demonopolizing the U. S.  food  manufacturing industries. 
Food Manufacturing Studies 
Bainsian Models 
Modell. 
Parker and Connor (1978,  1979) were the first to estimate consumer loss due to  market 
power in  the U.S. food  manufacturing industries.  The method used  for Modell was first 
5  Alternatively, one may speak of the trapezoid as the upper limit on  net social 
losses,_  as X can conceivably rise to  PM' 11 
developed by Collins and Preston (1968).  This method is solidly in  the Bainsian cross-
sectional tradition of industrial-organization research,  i.e., the form of the behavioral model 
and  maintained hypotheses about the signs of the independent variables were drawn a priori 
from  received theories of oligopoly and finance (Weiss  1974).  Four-digit SIC industry price-
cost margins were regressed against the four-firm concentration ratio, advertising intensity, 
an  adjustment for regional markets,  industry capital-output ratio, and sales growth.  Although 
the fit of the model was quite good, this approach has  several limitations.  First, the fact that 
the sample is  dr~wn from  one year (1972)  may  mean that transitory disturbances other than 
unexpected shifts in  demand have affected the estimates of the regression coefficients. 
Second, the price-cost margins are overly broad measure of profitability, containing several 
components of overhead expenses and other central administrative costs.  For other criticisms 
of the cross-sectional, price-cost margin analysis of performance, see Schmalensee (1989). 
The Parker-Connor approach employed three of Harberger's assumptions:  monopoly 
pricing, linear demand, and constant marginal costs.  However, an  average demand elasticity 
of 0.5 was adopted after a search of the food  demand literature.  Moreover, Parker and 
Connor adopted an  "effective competition" or "workable competition"  standard,  not the usual 
perfect competition standard (Scherer and Ross  1990:52-54).  Based on  their understanding 
of the threshold levels of market structure (there is  a substantial literature on the critical 
concentration level), they identified critical levels of concentration, advertising, and 
geographic markets extent so as to compute the upper level of workable competition in  food 
manufacturing.  The workable-competition level of profitability was subtracted from 
predicted monopoly profits. and a sensitivity analysis was performed.  Although informed by 
previous research,  identifying the workable competition standard required judgement by  the 
researcher. Table 1.  Predicted Dead-Weight Welfare Losses Due to  Imperfect Market Competition, 47 U.S. Food Manufacturing Industries, 
11  Models. 
Estimating Model" 
SIC 
(1977)  Industry·  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11 
Percent 
2011  Meat packing  0.00  0.05  0.01  0.00  0.29  0.89  14.3  0.98  24.0  0.00  0.50 
2013  Meat processing  0.08  0.06  0.02  0.04  0.13  0.39  6.3  0.42  8.6  0.00  2.85 
2016  Poultry dressing  0.00  0.18  0.08  0.01  0.42  1.28  20.4  1.47  - 0.00  2.30 
2017  Poultry 'and  egg processing  0.00  0.18  0.00  0.00  0.42  1.28  20.4  1.47  - 0.00  2.30 
2021  Butter  0.02  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.17  0.51  8.1  0.54  11.7  0.00  0.21 
2022  Cheese  0.03  0.17  0.27  0.01  0.40  1.22  19.4  1.37  43.1  0.01  1.32 
2023  Preserved milk  products  0.01  1.25  0.57  0.04  0.48  1.46  23.4  1.68  - 0.01  2.63 
2024  Ice cream,  frozen desserts  0.05  0.93L  0.60  0.01  0.14L  0.42L  6.7L  0.45L  9.8L  O.OOL  2.08L 
2026  Fluid milk and related  0.07  0.54L  0.50  0.01  0.22L  0.69L  Il.0L  O.77L  24.0L  O.OOL  O.66L 
2032  Canned specialties  0.78  2.08  0.74  0.22  8.57  26.26  420.1  - -- 0.56  0.97 
2033  Canned fruits  and vegetables  0.07  1.34  0.18  0.06  0.98  3.00  47.9  4.00  - 0.01  2.99 
2034  Dried fruits  and vegetables  0.37  1.27  0.19  0.14  1.63  4.99  79.8  7.67  - 0.03  3.17 
2035  Pickles and sauces  0.59  0.32  0.63  0.19  1.56  4.78  76.4  7.06  - 0.04  3.70 
2037  Frozen fruits  and vegetables  0.25  0.98  0.20  0.04  0.60  1.83  29.3  2.21  - 0.01  3.45 
2038  Frozen specialties  0.25  1.05  0.43  0.06  0.60  1.83  29.3  2.21  - 0.01  3.45 
-
f-
N ..  - . 
Table 1.  (Continued). 
SIC 
(1977)  Industry  I  2  3  4 
2041  Flour  0.05  0.48  0.23  0.02 
2043  Breakfast cereals  2.10  2.64  1.42  0.20 
2044  Rice  0.07  0.79  1.21  0.30 
2045  Flour mixes and doughs  1.20  2.85  1.05  0.08 
2046  Wet com milling  0.00  0.25  0.54  0.00 
2047  Pet  foods  ---- 3.36  1.06  0.16 
2048  Animal feeds  --- 0.36L  0.00  0.00 
2051  Bread and cakes  0.18  2.06L  0.61  0.11 
2052  Cookies and crackers  0.66  4.62  0.66  0.15 
2061  Raw cane sugar  0.00  0.15  0.00  0.00 
2062  Refined cane sugar  0.07  0.48  0.11  0.00 
2063  Refined beet sugar  0.01  1.17  0.11  0.00 
2065  Confectionery  0.53  2.15  0.36  0.08 
2066  Chocolate  0.56  1.97  0.60  0.13 
2067  Chewing gum  2.39  6.98  2.08  0.91 
--
Estimating Model" 
5  6  7 
3.70  11.34  181.4 
22.32  68.34  1,093.5 
1.10  3.36  53.8 
8.88  27.20  435.1 
15.48  47.41  758.5 
6.77  20.74  331.8 
1.23L  3.75L  60.1L 
0.70L  2. 15L  34.9L 
2.34  7.18  114.9 
17.52  53.66  858.5 
4.16  12.75  204.1 
4.16  12.75  204.1 
5.44  16.67  266.7 
1.23  3.76  60.2 
1.81  5.56  88.9 

















































W Table 1.  (Continued). 
II  I  I 
I  SIC 
i  (1977)  Industry  1  2  3  4 
2074  Cottonseed oil  0.00  0.13  1.49
b?  0.00 
I  2075  .  Soybean oil  0.00  0.08  1.49
b?  0.00 
i 
2076  Other vegetable oils  0.16  0.46  1.49b?  0.00 
2077  Animal fats  0.01  1.39  0.00  0.00 
2079  Margarine, cooking oils  0.58  0.80  0.81  0.38 
2082  Beer  0.88  1.06  0.67  0.36 
I  2083  Malt  0.00  -.-- 0.00  0.00 
2084  Wine and brandy  0.32  -. --- 0.28  0.05 
2085  Distilled spirits  1.46  6.50  0.59  0.06 
2086  Soft drinks bottling  0.96  0.85L  1.68  0.09 
2087  Flavorings  0.74  11 .24  0.93  0.15 
2091  Canned  fish  0.17  0.67  0.00  0.07 
2092  Frozen fish  0.00  0.48  0.17  0.00 
2095  Coffee  0.86  --- 0.78  0.06 
2097  Manufactured ice  0.00  2.15L  0.00  0.01 
2098  Pasta  0.59  1.61  0.00  0.07 
2099  Miscellaneous prepared foods  0.69  2.91  0.45  0.31 
20  Food manufacturing average  0.16  1.09  0.45  0.11 
Estimating Model 
5  6  7 
30.98  94.88  1,518.0 
1.82  5.58  89.3 
0.47  1.43  22.9 
2.07L  6.35L  101.5L 
1.28  3.93  62.9 
2.98  9.14  146.2 
1.71  5.25  84.0 
1.15  3.52  56.3 
12.96  39.69  635.0 
20.66  63.28  1,012.5 
42.85  131.22  2,099.5 
0.35  1.08  17.3 
0.07  0.21  3.4 
4.57  14.00  224.0 
0.31L  0.95L  15.2L 
2.96  9.08  145.3 
1.36  4.18  66.8 
5.15  15.77  289.1 












1.21  33.3 
















































Table 1.  (Continued). 
L  Local or regional markets, but study uses uncorrected national concentration data. 
--- Undefmed or not available . 
•  Modell:  Based on  1972 value of product shipments,  from  Parker and Connor (1978:  Table C.3),  unpublished estimates provided by Parker and Connor. 
Model 2:  Based on  1972 shipments,  from  Olson and  Bumpass (1984),  before-tax Hamerger losses, unpublished estimates provided by Olson and Bumpass. 
Model 3:  Based on  1975  shipments,  from  "Model 14"  in  Connor, ~  ru.  (1985:  Table D-4, second column),  unpublished estimates provided by  Parker and Connor. 
Model 4:  Based on  1979-1980 price data and  1977 shipments of branded products to  food  stores only,  from  Connor and Peterson (1992:  Table I, Equation  1.3), 
unpublished estimates provided by the authors.  This model and the following  models use elasticities  from  Pagoulatos and Sorenson (1986). 
Model 5-7:  Based on  1982 concentration and product shipments data (Connor 1988:  Table  11-4),  calculated from  formulas  for  Stakelberg, Cournot, and Collusive price 
leadership with  four  leaders and  linear demand in  Willner (1988). 
Model 8-9:  Same as  models 5-7, except for  isoelastic demand and Cournot and  Collusive price leadership (Willner  1988). 
Model 10:  Based on 1982 concentration and shipments, Cournot industry-wide pricing, linear or isoelastic demand , formulas  from  Willner (1988). 
Model  11 :  Based on  1987 concentration and shipments data,  from  Bhuyan and Lopez (1983: Table 1). 
b  Alternative model specifications  result in  point estimates that differ by more than two standard deviations.  Therefore,  estimated overcharges believed to  be unreliable. 
C  Some studies had only one estimate for  two  combined industries (e.g.,  2016  + 2017).  These estimates are repeated  in  the table. 
d  Where defined,  these isoelastic estimates are on average 5.6 higher than their linear demand counterparts (Coumot pricing) or 24 times  higher (collusive pricing). 
However,  in  the majority of industries, isoelastic demand produces infinitely high  prices. 
f-
lJ1 ~  ~ 




(1977)  Industry"  I  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Percent 
2011  Meat packing  0.0  \.31  0.2  0.0  9.3  16.3  65.2  6.66  89.2  1.02 
2013  Meat processing  5.6  0.76  3.5  3.4<  6.7  11.8  47.0  3.87  55.6  0.71 
2016  Poultry dressing  0.0  2.98  3.3  3.5<  16.7  29.2  116.7  6.27  - 0.83 
2017  Poultry and egg processing  0.0  2.98  0.0  O.Od?  16.7  29.2  116.7  6.27  - 0.83 
2021  Butter  3.1  1.71  2.0  O.OC  8.0  13.9  55.8  4.30  67.5  0.73 
2022  Cheese  3.5  2.94  5.3  0.2<  12.6  22.1  88.2  7.23  131 .3  1.70 
2023  Preserved milk products  1.7  7.92  12.0b?  10.1  15.1  26.4  105.5  7.66  - 2.15 
2024  Ice cream,  frozen  desserts  4.5  6.84L  13.6b?  2.7  8.7L  15.3L  61.IL  3.33L  70.9L  0.59L 
2026  Fluid milk and  related  5.3  5.21L  14.4  3.2  13.7L  24.0L  95.8L  3.87L  119.8L  l.lIL 
2032  Canned specialties  17.7  10.21  19.5  23.6  169.0  295.8  1,183.3  -- -- 43.23 
2033  Canned fruits  and vegetables  5.4  8.18  5.2  8.0  32.1  56.2  224.7  10.64  - 3.74 
2034  Dried fruits  and vegetables  12.1  7.94  10.1  10.8  33.9  59.3  237.2  7.24  ---- 6.22 
2035  Pickles and sauces  15.3  3.99  16.5  12.6  39.5  69.1  276.5  16.32  - 6.48 
2037  Frozen fruits  and vegetables  10.0  6.98  8.3  7.0  22.3  39.1  153.3  7.58  - 2.53 
2038  Frozen specialties  10.0  7.26  1\.8  7.7<  22.3  39.1  153.3  7.58  - 2.53 
f-
0\ Table 2.  (Continued). 
- - ------ -- -
. 
SIC 
(1977)  Industry  I  2  3 
2041  Flour  4.4  4.90  6.9 
-
2043  Breakfast cereals  29.0  11.49  27.9 
2044  Rice  5.1  6.29  16.6 
2045  Flour mixes and doughs  21.9  11 .94  22.8 
2046  Wet  com milling  1.2  3.56  11 .7
b? 
2047  Pet  foods  -. --- 12.95  21 .0 
2048  Animal  feeds  -- 4.26L  5.4 
2051  Bread and cakes  8.6  10.15L  14.3 
2052  Cookies and crackers  16.3  15.19  18.2 
2061  Raw cane sugar  0.0  2.66  0.0 
2062  Refined cane sugar  5.4  4.88  7.1 
2063  Refined beet sugar  1.5  7.63  7.1 
2065  Confectionery  14.6  10.63  12.6 
2066  Chocolate  15.0  9.91  13.5 
2067  Chewing gum  30.9  18.69  33.3 
Estimating Model" 
4  5  6 
37.6·  102.9  180.0 
38.4  385.7  675.0 
--- 34.9  61.1 
24.0  210.7  368.8 
-- 278.2  486.9 
24.3  150.2  262.9 
0.0  55.4L  9.69L 
16.5  19.7L  34.5L 
16.4  47.6  86.8 
0.0  418.6  732.5 
O.Od?  87.0  152.3 
O.Od?  87.0  152.3 
14.8  124.7  218.2 
9.7"  28.2  49.3 
35.1  41.6  72.7 
7  8 
720.0  -
2,700.0  -




387.5L  14.38L 
138.1L  8.28L 





197.1  14.00 


































-....J Table 2.  (Continued). 
SIC 
(1977)  Industry  I  2  3  4 
2074  Cottonseed oil  0.8  2.49  16.5
b?  0.0 
2075  Soybean oil  0.8  2.00  16.5
b?  0.0 
2076  Other vegetable oils  7.9  4.71  16.5
b?  0.0 
2077  Animal  fats  1.8  8.32  1.2  0.0 
2079  Margarine, cooking oils  15.2  6.32  18.6  23.4 
2082  Beer  18.8  7.27  17.9  20.8 
2083  Malt  0.6  -- 0.0  0.0 
2084  Wine and brandy  11.3  --- 12.7  7.6< 
2085  Distilled spirits  24.2  18.02  20.9  19.2 
2086  Soft drinks bottling  19.6  6.53L  26.3  37.9 
2087  Flavorings  17.2  23 .71  20.7  ----
2091  Canned fish  8.2  5.75  5.2  3.7' 
2092  Frozen fish  0.5  4.90  3.9  0.0 
2095  Coffee  18.6  -- 20.1  9.7 
2097  Manufactured ice  0.0  1O.22L  0.0  3.3 
2098  Pasta  15.4  8.96  9.7  13.3 
2099  Miscellaneous prepared foods  16.6  12.07  15.8  17.8 
20  Food manufacturing total  7.9  5.95  11.5  15.4 
Estimating Modell 
5  6  7 
787.1  1,377.5  5,510.0 
47.9  83.8  335.3 
17.4  30.4  121.6 
76.9  134.6  538.6 
36.8  64.3  257.4 
52.1  91.1  364.5 
43.7  76.5  306.1 
31.0  54.2  216.7 
360.0  630.0  2,520.0 
321.4  562.5  2,250.0 
925.7  r,620.0  6,480.0 
11.2  19.6  78.6 
4.0  7.0  28.1 
91.2  159.5  638.2 
18.0L  31.6L  126.3L 
77.0  134.8  539.0 
37.9  66.3  265.3 
115.7  202.6  815.9 












7.00  118.9 





























Table 2.  (Continued). 
L  Local or regional market, but study uses  uncorrected national concentration data. 
-- Undefined or not available  . 
•  Modell:  Based on  1975 value of product shipments,  from  Parker and Connor (1978:  Table C.3),  unpublished estimates provided by  Parker and  Connor. 
Model 2:  Based on  1972 shipments,  from  Olson and  Bumpass (1984),  before-tax  Harberger losses,  unpublished estimates provided by Olson and  Bumpass. 
Model 3:  Based on  1975 shipments,  from  "Model 14"  in  Connor, E. ru.  (1985:  Table D-4,  second column),  unpublished estimates provided by  Parker and Connor. 
Model 4:  Based on 1979-1980 price data and  1977 shipments of branded products to  food  stores only,  from  Connor and Peterson (1992:  Table  I, Equation  1.3), 
unpublished estimates provided by the authors.  This model and the following  models  use elasticities  from  Pagoulatos and Sorenson (1986). 
Model 5-7:  Based on  1982 concentration and  product shipments data (Connor  1988:  Table  11-4),  calculated from  fonnulas  for Stakelberg, Cournot, and Collusive price 
leadership with  four  leaders and linear demand  in  Willner (1989). 
Model 8-9:  Same as  models 5-7,  except  for  isoelastic demand and Cournot and Collusive price leadership (Willner  1988). 
Model 10:  Based on  1982 concentration and shipments,  Cournot industry-wide pricing,  linear or isoelastic demand,  fonnulas  from  Willner (1988). 
Model  11 :  Based on  1987 concentration and shipments data,  from  Bhuyan and Lopez (1983: Table  I). 
b  Alternative model specifications  result  in  point  estimates that differ by  more than two standard deviations.  Therefore, estimated overcharges believed to  be unreliable. 
C  Some studies had only one estimate for two combined industries (e.g.,  2016 + 2017).  These are repeated. 
d  Results  probably unreliable because same model yields vastly different estimates for  1979,  1890, and  1979-80 combined.  SpecificaUy,  the predicted percentage Lerner 
Indexes  for  1979 and  1980 were both more than 50%  higher (or lower) than the 1979-80 prediction . 
•  Results  may  be unreliable because predicted Lerner indexes are sensitive to  time period.  Specifically. one of the years  1979 or 1980 differs  by 25 % or more from  the 
1979-80 point estimates. 
I-
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The Connor-Parker study yielded an average dead-weight welfare loss twice as high 
as Harberger's--0.16 percent of 1975  food industry value of shipments (Table 1,  column 1). 
The average consumer overcharge, which Harberger did  not estimate,  was predicted to  be 
7.9 percent of food-manufacturing shipments (Table 2, column  1).  The total consumer loss 
ranged from  0 (for five industries) to  33  percent (chewing gum). 
Model 2. 
Olson and Bumpass (1984) also performed an  analysis the determinants of price-cost 
margins for the U.S.  manufacturing sector.  At our request, Olson and Bumpass prepared 
industry deadweight and consumer overcharge estimates for food  manufacturing using a 
"workable competition"  standard based on  profits (second column in  Tables 1 and 2).  Olson 
and Bumpass assumed monopoly pricing, linear demand, and constant marginal costs;  they 
based their benchmark profit  stan~ard on  average corporate earnings before taxes and 
interest, adjusted downward for R&D expenditures and  upward for understatement of assets 
due to historical-cost evaluation.  They calculated a Harberger welfare loss as well as a 
broader estimate of losses akin  to the consumer overcharge.  The latter estimate uses the 
Cowling-Mueller method, which counts half of advertising expenditures as X-inefficiency and 
derives elasticities of demand directly from  margins.  A contribution of Olson and Bumpass 
was dealing with transitory disturbances by  averaging over a very long period (1967-1981). 
For all manufacturing, Olson and Bumpass find  that the U.S.  (Harberger) welfare loss is 0.9 
percent of 1972 output and the consumer loss was 3.3 percent.  For food  manufacturing, the 
respective estimates are 1.09 and 5.95 percent (second columns of Tables  1 and 2). 21 
Model 3. 
The second method used by  Parker and  Connor is  their !1ational brand-private label 
price approach (revised in  Connor, et al.  1985).  The key assumption in  this study (and in 
Connor and Peterson 1992) is that the competitive benchmark Pc  is approximated by highly 
disaggregated, observed prices of private-label foods.  Using the percentage difference 
between national-brand and private-label prices as a proxy for the Lerner index, which we 
call a price-price margin, overcomes most of the criticisms of cross-sectional structure-
performance studies (Schmalensee 1989).  However, the second Parker-Connor approach still 
incorporates many Harberger ,assumptions:  linear demand, constant marginal costs, 
monopoly pricing, and a constant price elasticity  (Tl  =  0.5).  Welfare losses in  food 
manufacturing in  averaged 0.45 percent of 1975  shipments, and consumer overcharges 
averaged  11.5 percent (third columns of Tables  1 and 2).  Total consumer losses were about 
twice as high as were predicted from Models 1 and 2. 
A Post-Bainsian Model of Differentiated Oligopoly 
Model 4. 
Connor and Peterson (1992) used a different commercial food  price data set to 
calculate a price-price margin (the Lerner index) and introduced a number of refinements in 
its measurement, but the concept is  essentially the same price-price ratio used by  Parker and 
Connor.  However, they  relaxed many of the restrictive assumptions of the Harberger 
method.  The major change is  that their estimating model  is  derived from an explicit 
structural model of  dijferenliared oligopoly using  Cournot pricing.  Gone are the restrictive 
Harberger assumptions of unitary elasticity of demand,  monopoly pricing, and homogeneity 
of goods.  This last assumption in  particular seems unrealistic in  view of the overarching 22 
importance of product differentiation in explaining food-manufacturing competitiveness 
(Connor, et.  al,  1985).  Connor and Peterson were careful to  include in  their model 
adjustments for regional markets,  import competition, and variations in  the mix of mass 
media employed in product advertising.  Another major improvement was that empirical, 
independently estimated elasticities of manufacturers' derived demand that vary across 
industries are incorporated into the model (Pagoulatos and Sorenson,  1986).  The only 
Harberger assumptions retained by Connor and Peterson were that of constant marginal costs 
and linear demand.
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The Connor and Peterson consumer loss results are shown for the first time in Tables 
1 and 2.  Consumer overcharges averaged  15.4 percent of 1977 food-manufacturing 
shipments;  the dead-weight losses were virtually at Harberger levels--O.ll percent of 
shipments.  More detailed estimates are shown in  Connor and Peterson (1993:Table 3 and 4). 
Price Leadership Models 
The models discussed thus far have assumed industry-wide monopoly pricing or 
Cournot pricing.  We are fortunate in  having studies of welfare losses due to  market power 
in  food  manufacturing that examined the sensitivity of estimates to  alternative pricing 
assumptions.  Instead of assuming monopoly or Cournot oligopoly pricing, Gisser (1982) 
presented a model based on the assumption of price leadership.  Instead of linear demand, 
6  Models 3 and 4 used  significantly more disaggregated data than previous 
studies,  which aggregated processed foods  into 45  to 50 industries.  The 
commercial data sets defined about 400 product classes; each class on average 
accounted for less than 0.04 percent of u.S. household' disposable income. 
This tiny share implies that the income effect of a price change due to  market 
power is negligible.  Thus, Marshallian welfare losses coincide with Hicksian 
losses (Just,  et a1.  1982). 23 
Gisser assumed an isoelastic demand function:  Q = AP  -17  ,  where Q is quantity of a 
homogeneous product, P is price,  1]  is  the absolute value of elasticity of demand, and A a 
shift parameter.  This demand curve is convex with respect to the origin.  On the supply 
side, the Me curve is linear, and  the marginal cost elasticity  (E)  can be set at any positive 
value.  However, Gisser assumed that both the dominant firm  (or the leading firm group) and 
the price-taking fringe have identical supply elasticities, a convenient but restrictive 
assumption.  In the empirical work, Gisser assumed that  E = 1  for both groups of firms and 
that the leading group of price-markers consists of four perfectly colluding firms.  Another 
limiting assumption was that 1].  is equal for all  industries, the old Harberger assumption. 
With  1] =0.5, Gisser concluded that the consumer loss due to collusive price 
leadership was about seven percent, of which the dead-weight loss was 0.9 percent of 
shipments.  If  1] =1.0,  the dead-weight loss was reduced to 0.5 percent. 
In a critical comment on Gisser's model, Willner (1989) applied a similar price 
leadership model to  food  manufacturing that rejected certain assumptions of Gisser and 
relaxes others.  First, Willner considered the assumption that both price makers and price 
takers have identical  marginal cost elasticities  (E)  dubious because it implies that both sets of 
firms employ identical technologies.  He argued that the leaders should be expected to 
dominate an industry partially because of technological superiority, while the followers are 
more likely to operate at full  capacity just as competitive firms do.  He also argued that it is 
practically a stylized fact that large corporations have horizontal marginal costs. 
Accordingly, he assumed that  E =00 for the leaders and  E =0  for the followers.  Second, 
Willner took exception to  Gisser's assuming constant, and possibly arbitrary  1]  values. .. 
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Instead,  he adopts the empirical estimates of 11  that were used by Connor and Peterson 
(1992).  Third, Willner derives welfare-loss algorithms under three types of pricing behavior 
by the leading-firm group:  collusion (or dominant firm),  Cournot-Nash, or the more 
rivalrous Stackelberg pricing rule. 
Using Willner's algorithms we develop five more sets of estimates of economic losses 
in  U.S.  food  manufacturing.  The five models are: 
•  Model 5:  Stakelberg price leadership with linear demand, 
•  Model 6:  Cournot-Nash price leadership with linear demand, 
•  Model 7:  Collusive price leadership with  linear demand, 
•  Model 8:  Cournot-Nash price leadership with isoelastic demand, and 
•  Model 9:  Collusive price leadership with  isoelastic demand. 
(The sixth possible combination, Stakelberg pricing with isoelastic demand, was shown to be 
nonexistent. ) 
The estimates of deadweight social welfare losses for the five price-leadership models 
are displayed in  Table 1, and the corresponding consumer overcharges are shown in  Table 2. 
These estimates are based on  formulas that contain only three variables:  N (the number of 
firms in the price-leadership group), CRN (the N-firm concentration ratio), and 11.  Because 
the smallest CRN statistic available from  official U.S. sources is CR4, these estimates 
implicitly assume that the non-collusive leading-firm group always consists of four firms 
(N =4).  With data from commercial sources, future research would be able to demonstrate 
the sensitivity of the loss estimates to  variation in  N, including the dominant-firm case 
(N = 1).  A limitation of models 5 to  9 is that the CR4 data were not adjusted for 
international trade,  regional markets, and other factors that affect appropriate market 
boundaries, though such adjustments have been  made by previous researchers.  In  tables  1 .. 
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and 2, special symbols are added to warn the readers about poorly defined  markets.  Finally, 
although these price leadership models assume product homogeneity, an  examination of the 
elasticities used for calculating the welfare-loss estimates reveals that  11  is relatively low (in 
absolute value) in  food industries with highly differentiated goods (breakfast cereals, 
alcoholic beverages) compared to  industries with  more standardized consumer goods (meats, 
milk, bread).  Demand is  also extremely inelastic for foodstuffs purchased mainly by food 
processors for further processing (vegetable oils, flour,  and sugar).  Thus, product 
differentiation may be implicitly accounted for in  the variation in  11  . 
In  general,  the dead-weight welfare loss estimates from price leadership models are 
inversely related to  11  (in  absolute value).  For example, assuming linear demand, the 
average deadweight welfare loss for U.S.  food  manufacturing,  was an  implausibly high  289 
percent if the leaders collude;  if the leaders are noncooperative Cournot firms,  the loss drops 
to  15.77 percent; with Stackelberg pricing, the loss drops further to 5.15 percent (Table 1). 
With isoelastic demand schedules,  the welfare losses are many times higher;  in  fact,  in  most 
food  industries with  collusive price leadership,  the equilibrium price is infinitely high.  Of 
course,  the consumer overcharges are higher than  the welfare losses estimated (Table 2). 
General Oligopoly Pricing 
Model 10 . 
The final  set of estimates in  our survey looks at welfare losses under industry-wide 
general oligopoly pricing (Willner 1988, Willner and Stahl  1992).  Unlike the price-
leadership models, every firm  in  the industry uses the same pricing rule.  In  the case of f', 
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Model 10, all firms are Cournot-Nash oligopolists facing a linear industry demand schedule.7 
Industry elasticities of demand  TJ  are exogenously estimated separately for each industry 
(Pagoulatos and Sorenson,  1986).  Marginal costs are constant.  The data are 1982 
Herfindahl indexes of concentration,  uncorrected national market, SIC definitions. 
Model 11. 
This model was developed by Bhuyan and Lopez (1993), following closely work by 
Dickson and Yu  (1989).  Bhuyan and Lopez offer several alternative oligopoly models, but 
we will initially describe their "baseline case," which is based on  uncorrected  1987 U.S. 
Herfindahl indexes of concentration (H).  The assumptions of Model  11  are the same as for 
Model 10, except that the degree of industry-wide cooperation is allowed to vary across 
industries and demand is isoelastic.  The conjectural variation elasticity for firm  i is ai' and 
aj  =  Si  + cJ>D -sJ, where Sj  is  market share and  cJ>j  is  the cooperation parameter, which 
usually takes some value between 0 (Cournot) and  1 (monopoly).  By assuming aj=a for all 
firms,  it can be shown that a=H + cJ>(I-H)=TJ'~, where  $£  is the Lerner index.  Thus,  cJ> 
can be estimated from  a computed Lerner index  (<J.),  ij , and  H using the formula 
1>  =  ij<J.-H 
I-H 
Table 1 shows the deadweight welfare loss estimates for Model  10  (which assumes 
cJ>=O)  and Model  11  (which calculates  1 xi> >0).  Because the concentration and elasticities 
are so similar, the high welfare losses shown for Model  11  may indicate significant degrees 
7Willner (1988) also derives an algorithm for calculating welfare loss under isoelastic 
demand, but the estimates are usually only slightly higher than  the linear demand case, so 
they are not reproduced here. 27 
of cooperation exist in  most U.S. food  manufacturing industries.  8  Table 2 shows the 
consumer overcharges for Model  10;  the much  higher overcharges for Model  11  are not 
computed. 
Bhuyan and Lopez (1993) also perform several simulations of the effects on welfare 
loss due to changes in  the extent of cooperation, demand and supply elasticities, and pricing 
behavior, which  we summarize briefly.  As  expected, as  the degree of cooperation increases 
(as  cf>-l), so  do the estimated welfare losses.  There is also some variation in  net welfare 
loss when  11  changes, though not as great as  when  a  changes.  For example, when  11  =  0.5 
for all industries (the Parker-Connor assumption) and  cf>  =  ¢ , the welfare loss is  8.2 percent 
of sales,  Qut  when  11 =1.5  (the Scherer-Ross suggestion), the loss  falls  to  1.8 percent of sales. 
Under a wide range of parameters  (1.5  > 11  > 0,  00  > E  '? -2), pure monopoly gives rise 
to  losses roughly ten times higher than  monopolistic price leadership.  However, when 
Cournot pricing is  imposed, oligopoly and price leadership generate estimated welfare losses 
within a narrower range.  Specifically, when diseconomics of scale are present, estimated 
welfare losses from  the general oligopoly model are from  30 to  120 percent higher than those 
of the price leadership model.  However, when  the MC curve of the leaders is constant or 
negative, welfare loss estimates are  10  to  50 percent higher under price leadership compared 
to  industry-wide oligopoly. 
8  The 1987 values of H are slightly higher than the  1982 values used  for Model 
10;  five  7j  are also higher in  Bhuyan and Lopez (1983: 17)  than  in  Willner 
(1988).  Moreover, Model  11  assumes isoelastic demand,  whereas Model  10 
assumes linear demand.  Finally,  ~ is a rather broad price-cost margin 
(industry value added less labor costs as a percentage of value of shipments) 
that assumes  ~ =o under perfect competition, the implicit competitive standard. ,-
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Comparisons of Results 
Average economic losses due to  imperfect competition in  the U.S. food 
manufacturing industries from various studies are summarized in  Table 3.  It seems clear that 
the cardinal estimates of welfare losses due to  market power are on average quite sensitive to 
model specification,  that is,  assumptions about assumptions about pricing behavior and the 
demand curve.  The five price leadership models (5  to 9)  yield economic loss estimates that 
are distinctly higher than  the models that assume industry-wide oligopoly pricing (Models 1-4 
and  10-11).  One feature common to all  models is  that consumer overcharge estimates far 
exceed the deadweight welfare loss estimates--by a ratio of about 40  to  one on  average. 
Although average estimates of welfare losses or consumer losses are quite sensitive to 
model specification and data sources, what about the cross-industry ranking of such losses? 
Were the Bainsian cross-sectional techniques of the  1960s and  1970s misconceived, 
superannuated by the theoretical progress of the 1980s?  Were the enforcement officials in 
U.S. antitrust agencies who used, directly or indirectly, performance indicators to choose 
target industries misled by industrial studies (see Preston and Connor 1992)? 
Table 4 suggests that the answer these questions is no.  For five quite different 
analytical  methods,  there is  considerable overlap in  the industries with  the greatest consumer 
losses due to  market power.  Breakfast cereals, confectionery,  flour mixes,  pet foods,  canned 
specialty items (soups, baby foods,  etc.), and  most highly differentiated beverage industries 
appear repeatedly across the five columns.  Two models  (5  and  10)  that assume product 
homogeneity also list a few  producer goods that appear by virtue of extremely low price 
elasticities (flour,  sugar, corn fructose,  and cottonseed oil).  Yet, on  the whole,  the greatest 
losses are attributable to  heavily advertised,  high-value-added consumer products. " 
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Table 3.  Summary of Average Economic Losses due to  Market Power in  the U.S. Food 
Manufacturing Industries. 
Losses as a Percent of Output 
Deadweight  Consumer 
Empirical Approach  Welfare Loss  Overcharge 
Percent 
1.  Bainsian model,  Census price-cost margins, monopoly pricing"  0.16  7.9 
2.  Bainsian model, Census price-cost margins, monopoly pricing
b  1.09  6.0 
3. Bainsian model, price-price-margins,  monopoly pricing"  0.4S  ll.S 
4. Price-price margins, differentiated  oligopoly, Coumot pricing"  0.11  IS.4 
S. Stakelberg price leadership,  linear demand  S.IS  l1S.7 
6. Coumot-Nash price leadership, linear demand  IS.77  202.6 
7. Collusive price leadership,  linear demand  289.1  81S .9 
8. Coumot-Nash price leadership,  isoclastic demand  4.4+d  10.4 +d 
9. Collusive price leadership, isoelastic demand  19.8+d  8S.7+ d 
10. Industry-wide Coumot pricing,  linear or isoelastic demand<  0.17  19.6 
11.  Industry-wide oligopoly pricing, isoelastic demand  4.6S  - -
- -- =  Not available  . 
•  Uses  "workable competition" standard based on critical concentration ratio; assumes linear demand. 
b  Uses benchmark profit rate as competitive standard; assumes linear demand. 
<  Estimates of losses are nearly invariant to  the shape of the demand curve (See Table S). 
d  Most of the industries have equilibrium prices that are infinitely high.  When both methods yield  frinite 
estimates, the isoc1astic-dcmand  prices are approximately S to  SO%  higher than the linear-demand prices 
(Coumot case) or SO  to  100%  higher (collusive case). 
Source:  Tables  1 and 2. ~  f  .. 
Table 4.  The 15  U.S. Food Industries with the Largest Deadweight Welfare Losses due to Market Power, by Alternative 
Analytical Models. 
Modell:  Model 3:  Model 4:  Models 5, 6, &  7:  Model 10: 
Bainsian Model,  Monopoly  Differentiated Oligopoly,  Differentiated Oligopoly,  Cournot  Price Leadership,  Linear Demand,  Industry-Wide Cournot Pricing, 
Pricing,  Census Price-Cost Margin  Monopoly Pricing,  Price-Price  Pricing,  Price-Price  Margin  Elasticity and Concentration Data  Elasticity and Concentration Data 
Margin 
Chewing gum  Chewing gum  Chewing gum  Flavorings  Flavorings 
Breakfast cereals  Soft drinks  Margarine &  oil  Cottonseed oil  Cottonseed oil 
Distilled spirits  Breakfast cereals  Beer  Breakfast cereals  Soft drinks 
Flour mixes  Rice  Misc. prepared foods  Soft drinks  Breakfast cereals 
Soft drinks  Pet  Foods  Rice  Raw carie sugar  Raw cane sugar 
Beer  Flavorings  Canned specialties  Wet corn milling  Canned. specialties 
Coffee  Margarine &  oil  Breakfast cereals  Distilled spirits  Wet corn milling 
Canned specialties  Coffee  Pickles  &  sauces  Flour mixes  &  doughs  Distilled spirits 
Flavorings  Canned specialties  Pet  foods  Canned specialties  Flour mixes 
Misc.  prepared foods  Beer  Flavorings  Pet foods  Pet  foods 
Cookies &  crackers  Cookies &  crackers  Dried fruits,  vegs., soups  Confectionery  Confectionery 
Pasta  Pickles  &  sauces  Cookies &  crackers  Coffee  Flour 
Pickles and sauces  Bread &  cakes  Chocolate  Refined  sugar  Coffee 
Margarine  Chocolate  Bread &  cakes  Flour  Pasta 
Chocolate  Ice  cream  Soft drinks  Beer  Beer 
Source:  Tabls  1. 
Note:  In  each column the 15  industries are listed  in  descending order of percentage net welfare loss  due to  market power. 
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We further analyze economic losses due to  market power by correlating the 
percentage welfare losses in  the food  industries across the eleven sets of estimates (Table 5).9 
Perhaps the most striking feature of Table 5 is that none of the 55 correlation coefficients is 
significantly negative;  indeed, all  but a few  are significantly positive coefficients.  The 
analytical approach most strongly associated with the others is Cournot-Nash  pric~ leadership 
(Model 8), and the one most poorly associated with all  the others is  the"unconstrained" 
oligopoly pricing model developed by Bhuyan and Lopez (Model  11).  Another noteworthy 
result is that when demand is  linear,  the price leadership models result in  economic losses 
that are by construction perfectly correlated, irrespective of the pricing rule used  by the 
leaders (Models 5, 6, and 7).  Correlations between price leadership models with different 
demand curves are also quite close to  1.00. 
There is also a high association among consumer loss estimates for the four models 
that use the price-cost or price-price margins approach (Models  I to 4):  the six  correlations 
average 0.60.  This is remarkable, given the many differences in  time periods,  levels of 
aggregation, proxies for the Lerner index, assumed pricing behaviors, demand elasticities, 
competitive standards, and  a host of other measurement considerations.  However, each of 
the four price-cost or price-price margin  models share one characteristic not found  in  the 
remaining six  methods,  namely, a focus on  product differentiation.  Each of the four methods 
varies in  how it deals with differentiation, from  ad hoc,  a priori justifications (Modell) to a 
more formal,  theoretically explicit treatment (Model 4).  As a group,  the four models that 
incorporate product differentiation (l to 4)  are not highly correlated with  the homogenous-
9  Correlations of estimates of consumer losses are presented in  Table 8 of 
Connor and Peterson (1993). .... 
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product models (5  to  10).10  The 16 correlation coefficients that compare heterogeneous with 
homogeneous-product models average only 0.36 (Table 5). 
Conclusion 
Our principal finding is that model assumptions and measurement methods do affect 
the absolute levels of predicted estimates of economic losses due to imperfect competition, 
but with few exceptions such differences do not much affect the industrial ranking of loss 
estimates.  This is,  cardinal estimates vary substantially, but ordinal results very little.  The 
major exception to ordinal convergence is  whether the empirical method has explicitly 
included measures of product differentiation when calculating the Lerner index or Harberger 
triangle.  Of course,  our analysis was restricted to  the domain of food  manufacturing, but we 
expect that this conclusion may  hold for other industries with differentiated products . 
10  In averaging the coefficients in  Table 5 we treat Models 5, 6,  and 7 as one 
observation. ·  ;. 
Table 5.  Correlations among Estimates of Net Welfare Loss due to  Market Power in  U.S.  Food Manufacturing. 
Model 
I  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
Model Type 
Correlation Coefficient  eN) 
I. Bainsian,  Census price-cost margins,  1.00 
monopoly pricing. workable competition  (N =45) 
2.  Bainsian,  Census price-cost margins,  0.64  1.00 
monopoly pricing  (N=39)  (N=39) 
3. Bainsian,  price-price margin.  0.78  0.58  1.00 
monopoly pricing  (N=42)  (N =35)  (N=44) 
4. Post-Bainsian.  price-price margin.  0.71  0.23  0.65  1.00 
Coumot pricing  (N=45)  (N =38)  (N=44)  (N=47) 
Price Leadership. linear demand: 
5. Stakelberg pricing  0.27  0.53  0.40  -0.03  1.00 
(N=40)  (N =37)  (N =38)  (N=42)  (N=41) 
6. Coumot-Nash pricing  0.27  0.53  0.40  -0.03  1.00  1.00 
(N =40)  (N=37)  (N =38)  (N=42)  (N=43)  (N =41) 
7. Col1usive pricing  0.27  0.53  0.40  -0.03  1.00  1.00  1.00 
(N=40)  (N =37)  (N=38)  (N =42)  (N =43)  (N =44)  (N=4I) 
Price Leadership.  Isoelastic demand: 
0.51  0.44  0.48  0.47  0.97  0.97  0.97  1.00 
8. Coumot-Nash pricing  (N=25)  (N=23)  (N=23)  (N =25)  (N=25)  (N =25)  (N =25)  (N =25) 
9. Col1usive pricing  0.32  0.15  0.34  0.27  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  1.00 
(N=6)  (N=6)  (N=6)  (N=6)  (N=6)  (N=6)  (N=6)  (N=6)  (N=6) 
Industry-wide Oligopoly: 
0.34  0.65  0.48  0.06  0.86  0.86  0.86  0.81  0.71 
10.  Coumot-Nash pricing  (N=41)  (N=38)  (N =39)  (N=42)  (N=41)  (N=41)  (N=41)  (N =25)  (N=6) 
, 
11.  Unconstrained pricing  0.56  0.18  0.16  0.34  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.42  0.07 
(N =38)  (N =36)  (N =36)  (N =39)  (N=37)  (N =37)  (N=37)  (N=24)  (N=6) 
Note:  Estimates based on uncorrected local-market observations and other unreliable estimates are omitted. 
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